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RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
SUPREME COURT
By G. A. H. FRASER, of the Denver Bar
HE word "recent" in the title is intended to carry back
to January, 1934, the date of the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium case, the first of several decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States which made conservatives
stare and gasp. From that time to March, 1936, 67 statutes,
state and federal, have been tested, in whole or in part, by that
court, of which 26 were held unconstitutional and 41 constitutional. Forty-six of the 67 were state statutes, and of these
16 were held unconstitutional and 30 constitutional. Twentyone of the 67 were federal statutes, and of these 10 were held
unconstitutional and 11 constitutional.
Charles Warren, in the last edition of his book, "Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court," states that up
to June, 1935, the court had held only 73 federal statutes
unconstitutional in about 146 years of its existence, an average of one every two years. Obviously the proportion of
rejections has vastly increased of late, and the overthrow of
state statutes is also extensive. When one scans the last seven
volumes of Supreme Court reports, two reasons for this leap
to the eye. One is the multiplication of ill-devised tax laws,
whereby honestly puzzled or thievishly spendthrift legislatures have cast about for untapped sources of revenue, but
more important is the mass of novel and experimental enactments, state and federal, designed for the relief of debtors, the
regulation of business in matters heretofore left to individual
initiative, the equalizing of wealth, or the creation of prosperity by statute. These well-meant measures have often
been framed without regard to the basic liberties of the citizen under the constitution, or the equally basic duality of our
system with specifically limited powers in the federal government and all the residue in the states. Such legislative encroachments were foreseen by Thomas Jefferson when he
wrote:
"The executive, in our government, is not the sole, it is scarcely
the principal object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures is
the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years. That
of the executive will come in its turn, but it will be at a remote period."
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Through this welter the court has moved with its usual
impartiality, but with less than its usual accord. During the
last two years it has been unanimous in the great majority of
cases involving general law, but not in the tax cases or the
constitutional cases, and this is due both to the close and difficult questions presented and to the inborn qualities of the
judges themselves. In Gilbert and Sullivan's "Iolanthe," the
sentry, as he stalks up and down before the palace, sings:
"How every little boy or gal
That's ever born into the world alive
Is either a little liberal
Or else a little conservative."

This is a universal cleavage of human kind, often widened by heredity, environment, education and experience of
life. Hence it is natural to find the present Supreme bench
composed of four reliable conservatives, three equally dependable liberals (both terms only loosely descriptive), and two
unpredictables, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts, who
are found as often in one camp as in the other. There has
seldom been a better balanced court. In the great cases of the
recent past the liberals tend to favor social measures against
the assertion of individual rights. Also, to them the voice of
the legislature is the voice of the people, and therefore the
voice of God. They recognize, of course, the dominance of
constitutional restrictions, but would rather loosen than contract them, and especially in considering state statutes they
tend to give such wide and prevailing effect to the state police
power that anyone who attacks a statute under the "due process of law" or "equal protection of the laws" clause of the
14th Amendment is likely to have a bout of bad luck. In
all this they are frequently supported by the two free-lances.
The conservatives tend toward a more literal construction and
stricter application of the constitution. It is there that they
hear the voice of the people, authoritative through generations
of experience. They constantly invoke it to defend individual
liberty against the exactions and restrictions of the legislature and this is very noticeable in tax cases, where their regular tendency is to protect the taxpayer wherever possible. It
thus appears that both lines of constitutional interpretation
are ably represented: now one, now the other prevails accord-

DICTA

169

ing to the merits of the case, and justice is attained as substantially and as uniformly as can ever be hoped for in a fallible
world.
The Literary Digest reports that Judge Manton of the
2nd C. C. A. recently attacked the conservative wing of the
court for, as he said, thrusting its "pet economic or social theory" into the constitution. If this criticism is correct, which I
do not believe, exactly the same is true of the liberals, and of
late there have been many critics of both wings of the court,
such as the man, Raymond Clapper, who daily strews our
breakfast tables with the sweepings of the Washington pressrooms.
None of us likes to have his preferences thwarted, and
probably each of us, from the radical to the reactionary, would
have preferred some of the late decisions to have gone the
other way; but when you read, not merely one or two, but
the entire recent series of great constitutional opinions, including the dissents, where there were dissents, you cannot fail to be impressed by the straight course the court has
steered through troubled waters, and by the honesty and
earnestness with which all the judges without exception
have applied their very high abilities to doing absolute right
as they severally saw it.
Representative Zioncheck recently said in Congress: "I
do not believe that the judges of the Supreme Court are gods;
in my opinion only three of them are gods," and yet these
three, with their well-known liberal views, joined in rejecting the Frazier-Lemke Mortgage Act, the NRA itself, and a
number of minor enactments, and two of them joined in the
rejection of the so-cMled "hot oil" Act. The man who says,
as many are saying, that the Supreme Court is in politics, or
that it has decided cases to suit the social or economic prejudices of its members, is either an ignoramus or a blinded partisan or a hired propagandist and I believe that every honest
lawyer, from the conservative to the communist, should repel
such slanders whenever heard. The essential nature of the
men leads one set to feel that a strict constitutional construction is right and the other set a free construction, but you have
only to read their opinions to see that beyond this inherent
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quality their minds are bent solely on the legal qualities of the
statute before them, as tested by the constitution.
What, then, has the court actually decided in the last two
years?
With 6 7 cases before us we can choose very few and touch
those very lightly. Decisions on state statutes are quite as
instructive as those on federal statutes, although less sensational, and there is one group which I am impelled to mention.
As you all know, there is no constitutional ground on which
state statutes are more frequently attacked than the 14th
Amendment, forbidding the state to deny due process of law
or the equal protection of the laws, expressions which are very
wide and indefinite and leave much room for diversity of opinion among judges. It is worth while to notice the Supreme
Court test as illustrated by the New York milk cases, which
are as interesting economically as legally. They show what
happens when a state attempts to fit ordinary business to a
legislative bed of Procrustes. There are seven or eight of these
milk cases, so that my attempt will be merely to do a little
skimming.
New York state suffered from an overproduction of
milk. Farmers complained that they did not make expenses.
Dealers complained that there was price-cutting and competition destructive of their profits. Consumers were not complaining, but who pays any attention to consumers? The
legislature undertook to remedy the situation by fixing a minimum price of 5 cents a quart to be paid by dealers to farmers and a minimum of 10 cents a quart to be charged to consumers by dealers who made delivery, or 9 cents a quart
by dealers selling over the counter. A small Italian grocer
sold two quarts for 18 cents and gave a 5-cent loaf of bread
as a bonus (suggesting, incidentally, the size of the profit
which dealers were making under the artificial price). He
had to go to jail for that, and in Nebbia vs. New York, 291
U. S. 502, the Supreme Court by a 5-4 decision left him there.
The question was whether the state had the right to fix prices
of an ordinary commodity, or whether its price-fixing power
was limited to public utilities or to a business directly affected
with a public interest. Mr. Justice Roberts says for the majority that, as the state may protect free competition and pro-
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hibit monopolies, so equally it may restrict competition if it
thinks it wise; that it is for the legislature to decide what trade
or business needs control for the public good, and that when it
controls it, by price-fixing or otherwise, the law "is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and
hence an unnecessary and unwarrantable interference with
public liberty." The four conservatives observed that the decision went beyond anything previously held by the court and
paved the way for legislative despotism.
The next step was taken by consumers. Deprived by
law of cheap milk, they naturally tried to get the best milk for
their money, and turned to Borden's and similar reliable and
well-known brands. Thereupon, the wise milk board, deeming that Borden et al. were getting too much business, to the
detriment of less-known dealers, passed another regulation
providing that dealers "having a well-advertised trade name"
must charge 1 cent more per quart to consumers than more
obscure vendors. This also was upheld by a 5-4 decision
(Borden's Farm vs. Ten Eyck, 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453), on the
ground that the state power to regulate business includes the
power to equalize it. The four conservatives, or, to my thinking, liberal dissenters, considered the law grossly arbitrary
and oppressive, as penalizing the man who becomes wellknown and successful through wide and honest dealing and
depriving him of the equal protection of the laws.
The next point in this object lesson in the economics of
artificial high prices was raised by a new set of dealers-I do
not say a set of New Dealers. Observing the opportunity of
profit in the 100 per cent spread between the price at which
dealers must buy and must sell, they rushed into the New
York market, to the disturbance of the unstable equilibrium
artificially created. Thereupon the milk board, in a desperate
attempt to maintain its theory of equalized trade, issued a new
ukase to the effect that any dealer entering the business after a
certain date must sell for not less than Mr. Borden and others
with famous trade names; i.e., must sell at a higher price than
the ordinary dealers already in business. This was carried
up on the same clauses of the 14th Amendment, and at last
the worm turned. The badgered court, in Mayflower Farms
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vs. Ten Eyck, 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 457 (Feb. 10, 1936), held
that this in effect prohibited any new dealer from entering the
business and considered the classification to be arbitrary,
oppressive and a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The three so-called liberal judges dissented.
Earlier in time, but the final stroke in the economic picture, came Baldwin vs. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, a good illustration of the lengths to which a legislature may be driven in
bolstering up an attempt to make economic adjustments by
fixing prices. A dealer, not satisfied with the law-made 100
per cent spread between his buying price and selling price,
began importing milk from Vermont where there was no price
control and where farmers would sell for less than 5 cents per
quart. The milk board countered by totally prohibiting the
sale in New York of milk imported from other states if it had
been bought there for less than the New York price to farmers.
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously enjoined this as a
restriction of commerce between the states and as an attempt
to neutralize price advantages prevailing in the state of origin
by what amounted to a customs barrier errected by one state
against another. Thus we see New York, starting with
more milk than it knew what to do with, and ending by
bringing in an additional flood of milk from other states, all
by its own regimentation. Sic semper tyrannis! The court,
of course, sedulously avoids any opinion as to the wisdom or
policy of any of the measures before it, but even the court,
while sustaining one of these milk laws, could not refrain from
saying:
"The present case affords an excellent example of the difficulties
and complexities which confront the legislator who essays to interfere
in sweeping terms with the natural laws of trade or industry."

The upshot of these cases is that a state statute will be
upheld against the 14th Amendment if it relates to any matter
of public welfare and is not glaringly arbitrary. To be set
aside, it must either have a private-rather than a public bearing or it must involve such gross inequality or do such unnecessary damage to individuals as to shock the conscience. Here
the difference between the two lines of thought in the court
is very clear. The conservatives try to preserve individual
rights against undue statutory interference; the liberals treat
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the legislative power as almost unlimited in any possible field
of public interest, and decline to apply the constitutional restrictions unless the lawmakers have acted as "arbitrary
despots" (Cardozo, J.). The old wing emphasizes individualism, the other collectivism. There is logic on both sides
and the majority may be moving with the times, but it seems
to me that the constitution concerns itself very specially with
individual liberty, and that the alternative to individual liberty is collective tyranny. Here again Mr. Jefferson says:
"It would be a dangerous delusion if our confidence in the men of
our choice (i. e., the legislators) should silence our fears for the safety
of our rights. * * * In questions of power, then, let no more be
heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the
chains of the constitution."

Following this great authority, I think that the courts
are the last, and often the only defense of liberty, and that it is
a pity when they stretch the constitution to uphold the passing crotchets of legislatures such as we all have known.
However, this is merely an idle reflection, since the Supreme Court thinks otherwise. In the days of that outstanding and dominant personality, Grover Cleveland, there was a
popular song about him, the refrain of which ran:
"And when the old man says a thing,
Why, that's the thing that goes;
For the old man says so,
And the old man knows."

So of the Supreme Court.
The famous cases of the recent past, sustaining or overthrowing acts of Congress, are fresh in your memory, and are
far too massive for summary treatment. Only the gold cases
and the Triple A case seem to me to present any legal novelty.
With the others the novelty is not in the constitutional law
announced by the court, but in the measures to which that law
was applied. This struck the court itself, since the majority
opinion in the Triple A case, after instancing many fantastic
laws which might follow if the Triple A were upheld, adds:
"It cannot be said that they envisage improbable legislation. The
supposed cases are no more improbable than would the present act have
been deemed a few years ago."
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These recent cases cannot well be classified, for Congress
is now seen casually handing over its law-making power to
Tom, Dick, Harry or Franklin, and now arrogating that
power over fields belonging to the states, or to individuals.
The only qualities common to most of the questioned acts are
a purpose to help the less fortunate by reforming national
economy, and the assumption of unlimited power to do so,
including the power to transfer power. Several of these acts
rather candidly embody the idea of taking one man's property
and giving it to another, which still remains a legislative solecism. The existence of a supreme law, restraining Congress,
as well as the rest of us. is ignored, and the fact that some of
these measures do fall within the constitution seems almost
accidental. Assuming a constitution, the court's rejection of
the others was inevitable. Time allows a mere mention of
some of the more spectacular cases. In Panama Refining Co.
vs. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, the court, standing 8-1, rejected the
clause of the NIRA authorizing the president to prohibit or
not, as he pleased, the movement in interstate commerce of oil
produced or taken from storage in excess of the amount
allowed by the state of origin. This for the elementary reason
that Congress, to which the constitution gives "all legislative
power," had made no law regulating the transit of oil, but
virtually gave the president the right to legislate regarding it
to suit himself.
In RailroadRetirement Board vs. Alton R. R., 295 U. S.
330, the Railway Pension Act was overthrown by a 5-4 decision. In speaking of it to a railroad attorney I said that in
the majority opinion Mr. Justice Roberts first tore the act into
shreds, and then stamped and spat on the shreds, which I
think is a fair summary of the decision. The dissenters thought
that if a few extreme clauses were rejected the bulk of the act
might stand, and especially urged that the majority went too
far in holding that no railway pension act lay within the
interstate commerce power. It would not surprise me if a
fairer and more moderate bill were some day passed and sustained.
In Louisville Land Bank vs. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, the
Frazier-Lemke amendment to the Bankruptcy Act in favor of
farmer mortgagors was unanimously held unconstitutional.
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Congress under the bankruptcy power may discharge the
debtor's personal obligation, but it cannot take the creditor's
secured rights in specific property. To do so would be to
take one man's property and give it to another, and if public
necessity should require such result, it could be legally done
only under the eminent domain power and on payment of just
compensation. This act has been redrafted by lawyers holding this decision in one hand and the Minnesota mortgage
case in the other, and the lower federal courts are already at
variance as to the validity of the new act.
As to the three gold cases in 294 U. S. (Norman vs. B. &
0. R. R., p. 240; Nortz vs. U. S., p. 317; Perry vs. U. S., p.
330), the syllabi alone cover seven pages; the cases themselves
140 pages; they touch the very foundations of government;
how can one discuss them here? They are unusual because it
is seldom that the court has to construe the power of Congress
"to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign
coin." Under this section the Court, by a 5-4 decision, upheld the various acts devaluing the dollar, calling in gold, and
authorizing the payment of gold obligations, public or private, in the depreciated currency, dollar for dollar, but with
one important qualification. Congress could not repudiate
the promise to pay in gold, set forth in government bonds. To
do so would destroy the faith and credit of the United States,
pledged for these bonds, and might at some critical time result
in the overthrow of the nation itself. The promise to pay in
gold was that of a greater than Congress, viz.: the sovereign
people, besides which, the 14th Amendment provides that
"the validity of the public debt of the United States * * *
shall not be questioned." However, said the court, if the
treasury had paid gold to the holder of a government bond he
would have had immediately to turn it back, and the currency he actually received was worth as much in purchasing
power as gold, for any purpose for which he could lawfully
use gold. Therefore, he sustained only nominal damages.
The conservatives considered this a quibble, and maybe
it was. If the bondholder had been a nonresident foreigner
and had been paid in depreciated currency, not circulating in
his own country, instead of the gold his bond called for, he
would have sustained a very substantial loss. It is worth
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noting that Congress paid the Philippine government an extra
amount in devalued currency so as to equal the actual loss sustained by the inflation, and has recently done the same thing
with the Republic of Panama.
However, under the necessities of the case it is hard to see
how the decision could have been otherwise. If the holders
of many billions of bonds, public and private, could have
enforced payment in current money of $1.69 for each $1.00
of their bonds, the new economic structure of the nation might
have been totally wrecked. This is not a legal argument, but
courts do not ignore such facts.
Few cases could be of greater public importance than the
NRA decision (Schechter Poultry Co. vs. U. S., 295 U. S.
495) ; yet the law involved was simple and the rejection of the
act inevitable. So thought a unanimous court. Mr. Justice
Cardozo filed a concurring opinion in which he flayed the act
more cruelly than the others did. It is dead and gone now,
and we need only note that it rested on two glaring errors.
(1) Congress attempted to hand over its law-making power,
first to various undefined trade groups or associations, and
finally to the president, giving these delegates power to make
codes having the force of law, although Congress had not defined what such law should be; (2) it empowered the president to assume complete control of every detail of trade and
industry throughout the nation in a way that would have
completely extinguished the reserved power of the states over
their domestic affairs. It thus struck at the very foundation
of our dual system. Even the chief justice, always moderate,
was stirred by so unprecedented a measure, and asks whether
anyone ever supposed that Congress could hand to any one
man a roaming commission to dictate laws for all the industries of the United States.
If you care to read the act (48 Stat. L. 195) and the
opinion you can decide for yourselves whether it was framed
in ignorance of the constitution or in defiance of it. There
used to be plenty of lawyers in Congress not without repute
before they joined that body.
The next great case is that of Triple A (U. S. vs. Butler,
56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 312), usually called the Hoosac Mills case,
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where the Agricultural Adjustment Act was held invalid on
a 6-3 division, the three regular liberals dissenting. None of
the recent decisions is more important legally and I wish there
were time to analyze it. It is also novel, because the court
has seldom had to consider the limits of the power of Congress under Art. 1, Sec. 8, of the constitution authorizing it
"to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay
the debts and provide for the general welfare of the United
States." No term could be wider than "general welfare." Are
there any bounds to what Congress may do within it through
the medium of a tax with which it can buy or coerce obedience to its will?
Here the government urged that agriculture was essential
to the general welfare and that therefore it could levy a tax to
foster it. Plaintiffs contended that Congress' right to act in
any direction was restricted to its specifically enumerated powers; in other words, that these powers covered and limited the
general welfare for which it could tax and spend. The court
rejected both views, holding that the power to tax is wider
than the enumerated powers, yet is not unlimited. The cardinal and fundamental feature of our system is the dual government of state and nation, and the wide right to tax for general
welfare is limited by the still wider restriction that Congress must not invade the reserved powers of the states. Powers not expressly granted to Congress are prohibited to it. No
power is granted to regulate agricultural production; therefore, that power remains in the states and Congress may not
assume it. Also, if Congress could do this with agriculture,
it could equally control every field of trade or activity
throughout the nation, and exact money from one branch of
an industry in order to pay it to another.
There was a vigorous dissent and a lawyer whom I asked
what he thought of the case replied that he had read the opinion and the dissent and thought they were both right. The
gist of the dissent is that, admitting that Congress may not
use tax money to coerce action in matters within state control,
yet it is not debarred from influencing such action; that it has
often done so under the interstate commerce and other powers, and that here the coercive effect of the act is not established
but rests only on a process of speculative reasoning. It is evi-
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dent that the majority felt that the vague authority to levy
taxes to provide for the general welfare had to be defined and
restricted. A broad interpretation of the words would allow
Congress to do anything and everything. It might reduce or
increase production, fix wages or hours, define conditions of
employment, distribute the industrial population, raise or
lower prices, regulate the professions or do anything whatsoever that it pleased by the simple device of levying a tax in
such a way as either to purchase or compel compliance with its
will. Thus it could destroy the police power of every state
by occupying the field itself. Here again the decision was compulsory. There was a choice between rejecting the act or
renouncing our dual system of government. It is interesting
to note that abuse by Congress of the taxing power under this
section was attacked in veto and other messages by presidents
as diverse as Monroe, Jackson, Tyler, Polk, Pierce, Grant,
Arthur, Cleveland and Harding.
The Tennessee Valley Authority case, Ashwander us. T.
V. A., 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466 (Feb. 17, 1936), promised to be
one of the first importance and was expected to decide the
right of the federal government to go into business in competition with private light and power companies. However, the
decision fell within narrow bounds and left this undetermined. It expressly states that no opinion is passed on the
governmental power to operate distribution systems, or to
build the three other dams now under construction, or as to
what the government might do with the water power therefrom or as to the validity of the TVA act itself. All that it
decides is that when the government builds a dam under the
war clause and the commerce clause and generates thereby more
electric power than it needs for war or commerce purposes, it
can sell that power, under Art. 4, Sec. 3, of the constitution,
authorizing Congress to dispose of the property of the United
States, and since it can sell it, it can acquire transmission lines
to carry it to market. The majority here was 8-1.
We know that the purpose of the TVA is to build other
dams and create a vast system of generation and distribution
in competition with private companies. The opinion is so
carefully worded as to give little clue to the probable fate of
the scheme when it comes before the court.
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As you have noticed, many of these vital cases ring with
dissent, and it would be interesting to know-what we never
shall know-what takes place in the conference room. Occasionally the language of an opinion gives some hint. For
example, in one of the New York milk cases Judge Cardozo,
dissenting, describes part of Judge Roberts' opinion as "a
juggling with words," and in the Triple A case Judge Stone,
dissenting, says that part of the majority's reasoning "hardly
rises to the dignity of argument." Of the present bench, Judge
Cardozo commands the most picturesque English and is at
times diffuse in its use. In one instance where he delivered the
florid and very lengthy majority opinion, Judge McReynolds
commenced his dissent with the curt remark: "This case has
been greatly obscured by verbiage." Thus judges themselves
remind us that they are human.
It was said earlier that dissent in the court is frequently
due to the conflicting trends of thought of the different judges.
This might be expanded a little. It is elementary that every
intendment must be made in favor of the constitutionality of
a statute. It must be accepted if by any reasonable construction of it or of the constitution it can be brought within the
scope of that instrument. The court constantly announces
this rule, and never more punctiliously than when about to
declare a statute unconstitutional. Now, when a doubtful
case comes before the court, I believe the conservative attitude
is something like this:
"After all, the final responsibility is ours. This court is the designated interpreter of the constitution and the last resort of the people. If,
by reason of some scintilla of doubt, we uphold an act which, on balancing reasons, we feel to be unconstitutional, we shirk our duty, and
subject the people to an act of tyranny, for any act which Congress had
no power to pass is necessarily such. We are bound, therefore, to reject
the act, and leave Congress to pass another, clearly within constitutional

limits."

The liberals, I think, reason somewhat as follows:
'Congress which passed this act, and the president who signed it,
are presumed to have judged it constitutional after due deliberation. To
substitute our judgment for theirs, except in a perfectly clear case, is a
usurpation of power. They, not we, represent the people; the responsibility for the act is theirs, not ours. The duty to refrain from thwarting the will of the people, as voiced by their representatives, is so impera-
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tive, and the presumption of constitutionality is so controlling that, if
we have any doubt whatsoever, we must uphold the act."

You see that both views are entirely reasonable and yet
that, in a close case, they must inevitably clash.
However, when one reads these great cases together and
not at long intervals as they appear, they fall into line, and
form a straight course of singularly level-headed and evenhanded adjudication. With our constitution as it is, it is
hard to see how any one of the cases involving federal statutes
could have been decided otherwise than it was. It is a small
matter, but worth notice, that in only two of the great cases
was there a 5-4 decision-the gold group where the act was
sustained, and the railway pension case, where it was rejected.
We have nine honest, resolute and very able men, representing
the two main attitudes of human thought and constitutional
construction, so evenly divided that the best reason can always
command a majority over any unconscious bias. We are
indeed fortunate in a time of popular ferment that the last
word as to our rights rests with so sane and impartial a body.
In all this I am taking the constitution for granted.
Whether it should be changed or not is another question, but
how well the present instrument has served its intended purpose is seen from the vigorous words of John Randolph. Inquiring into the need of a restrictive constitution, and how the
people had come to assent to it, he said:
"It was because of the radical depravity and original sin of their
nature, which called for wholesome restraint. In a lucid interval, they
had wisely determined to tie up the hands, not only of their agents, but
themselves, that, when the hour of passion should come, barriers might

be opposed to their inconsiderate rashness."

PERIODS DURING WHICH JUDGES WILL SIT-1936
Judge Robert W. Steele
....-------June 29 to July 11, Inclusive --------------July 13 to July 25, Inclusive ---------------------------------.Judge Otto Bock
July 27 to August 8, Inclusive ----...------- Judge Frank McDonough, Sr.
August 10 to August 22, Inclusive ----------Judge Charles C. Sackmann
August 24 to September 5, Inclusive -----------Judge J. C. Starkweather
All Return September 8 (Day After Labor Day)
Judge Calvert to July 18; Judge
CRIMINAL DIVISION:
Dunklee, July 20 to September 8.

